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COMMENT 
The Wilderness Act of 1964: Where Do We Go From 
Here? 
The signing of the Wilderness Act1 into law on September 3, 
1964, marked the beginning of a new era for wilderness conserva- 
tionists. The Act established a National Wilderness Preservation 
System (NWPS) initially encompassing 54 wilderness areas cov- 
ering some 9.3 million acres in 10 Western  state^.^ The Act pro- 
vided guidelines for the usage of the lands within the system, and 
established procedures for reviewing over 220 additional units of 
land for possible inclusion within the next 10 years. 
This comment will evaluate the continuing viability of the 
Wilderness Act in light of the more than 11 years which have 
elapsed since its passage. Following a brief historical overview 
and a synopsis of the provisions of the Act, the comment exam- 
ines some of the problems encountered in the application of the 
guidelines for inclusion of additional lands. A short statistical 
abstract of the present composition of the NWPS will then be 
presented. Next, a discussion of the difficulties encountered in 
administering lands under the Act's vaguely defined wilderness 
concept will be presented, followed by an analysis of the need to 
change the present wilderness concept. The comment concludes 
with some specific suggestions for amending the Act to eliminate 
several of its present inconsistencies and to provide a two-tiered 
system for accomodating both pure wilderness areas and areas 
which would allow limited commercial exploitation. 
The early American settlers had little need for a wilderness 
preservation act. Their biggest problem was how to tame the 
1. 16 U.S.C. §§  1131-36 (1970). 
2. The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING WILDERNESS MAGAZINE 41 (1975). 
3. For a more fully developed historical account of the background and history of the 
wilderness preservation movement in America and of the Wilderness Act of 1964, see R. 
NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as NASH]; 
J. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as SUNDQUIST]; McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Back- 
ground and Meaning, 45 ORE. L. REV. 288, 289-301 (1966) [hereinafter cited as McClos- 
key]; Mercure & Ross, The Wilderness Act: A Product of Congressional Compromise, in 
CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mercure]. 
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wilderness. As the natural environment began to disappear, how- 
ever, wilderness began to represent to increasing numbers of "be- 
lievers" a meaningful touchstone to America's past.4 In short, 
what was once a challenge to conquer became a challenge to 
preserve. 
An overview of the important developments leading up to the 
passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 logically begins in 1900,5 
when the city of San Francisco proposed the construction of a 
dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley located in Yosemite National 
Park.' The people of San Francisco were in need of a fresh water 
supply, and city planners saw the Tuolomne River in the Hetch 
Hetchy Valley as an ideal location for the erection of a dam.7 A 
small but dedicated group of conservationists viewed the matter 
differently, characterizing the valley in its natural state as a 
"public playground" which should not be defiled. The proponents 
of the dam and reservoir argued that San Francisco's need for an 
adequate fresh water supply should certainly take priority over a 
chimerical wish to preserve the wilderness. The preservationists 
countered by suggesting alternative water sources and describing 
in graphic detail the senselessness of replacing the high walls, 
rugged cliffs, and meandering river of the Hetch Hetchy Valley 
4. McCloskey 290-92. McCloskey suggests five reasons why the early settlers of our 
country valued the wilderness: (1) the wilderness was a challenge to those who explored 
and settled it; (2) "[tlhe powerful presence of nature in the wilderness served as an aid 
to religion and as a setting for religious experiences"; (3) wilderness was viewed as a 
setting for political reform; (4) "wilderness served as a refuge or sanctuary"; (5) the need 
to preserve the wilderness was stressed in literature which sounded alarms about the 
"depletion of natural resources and massive wastage." Id. McCloskey also lists six reasons 
why modem day preservationists seek to conserve wilderness regions: (1) wilderness is 
regarded as a national heritage; (2) wilderness is regarded as an important setting for 
scientific research in the biological sciences; (3) maintenance of wilderness is evidence of 
an intent to meet ethical obligations (man should exercise self-restraint in the extent to 
which he disturbs the rest of nature); (4) wilderness today is valued as an opportunity for 
an educational experience; (5) wilderness is valuable for therapeutic reasons; (6) wilder- 
ness is regarded as "the optimum setting for many sport forms of highest quality." Id. a t  
292-94. 
5. This is not to say that earlier efforts to protect the wilderness had not been made. 
For example, Yosemite National Park was created in 1864 and Yellowstone National Park 
in 1872. 
6. For interesting discussions of the Hetch Hetchy controversy see H. JONES, JOHN 
MUIR AND THE SIERRA CLUB 85-169 (1965); Richardson, The Struggle for the Valley: Califor- 
nia's Hetch Hetchy Controversy, 1905-1913, 38 CALIF. HISTORICAL SOC'Y Q. 249-58 (1959). 
7. City engineers had considered damming the narrow end of the valley since the 
1880's but were temporarily forced to abandon this proposal when the Act creating Yosem- 
ite National Park designated the Hetch Hetchy Valley a "wilderness preserve." The 
impetus needed to revive the argument for the erection of a dam came in April 1906 when 
the San Francisco f i e  and earthquake "added urgency and public sympathy to the search 
for an adequate water supply." NASH 161. 
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with an unsightly re~ervoir.~ A long series of debates and public 
and congressional hearings ensued,' but when the dust finally 
settled more than 13 years after the city's original recommenda- 
tion, Congress had voted to approve the city's proposal.1° 
The preservationists' loss in the Hetch Hetchy controversy 
by no means totally defeated their cause. For the first time in 
American history, wilderness preservation had become an issue 
of national prominence. Moreover, the controversy had identified 
the positions and constituencies of the opposing factions and had 
demonstrated the need for careful organization and planning in 
place of sporadic emotional outcries. On one side was a small but 
highly motivated group of preservationists sharing the common 
belief that the natural environment must in some degree be pre- 
served for future generations.ll On the other side were the lumber- 
ing, mining, irrigation, and livestock interests, who viewed the 
wilderness as another area for commercial development, l2 and the 
recreationists, who saw the wilderness areas as excellent places to 
8. Id. a t  161-70. For a more detailed account of the various tactics used and argu- 
ments advanced by both sides of the Hetch Hetchy controversy see id. a t  162-79. 
9. Id. at 162-79. The two schools of thought over the controversy are illustrated by 
the following statements; 
As to my attitude regarding the proposed use of Hetch Hetchy by the city of 
San Francisco . . . I am fully persuaded that . . . the injury . . . by substitut- 
ing a lake for the present swampy floor of the valley . . . is altogether unimpor- 
tant compared with the benefits to be derived from its use as a reservoir. Gifford 
Pinchot, 1913. 
These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism seem to have a 
perfect contempt for nature, and instead of lifting their eyes to the God of the 
Mountains, lift them to the Almighty Dollar. John Muir, 1912. 
Id. a t  161. 
10. President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the bill authorizing the dam on De- 
cember 19, 1913. Id. a t  179. 
11. The philosophy that certain areas should be preserved in their natural state is 
not unique to the 20th century. Toward the end of the middle ages, St. Francis of Assisi 
praised God for the natural environment and early philosophers such as Edmund Burke, 
Immanuel Kant, and Lord Byron were strong supporters of the worth of pure wilderness. 
McCloskey 290. See also E. BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS 
OF THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL (1971). For a modern philosophical viewpoint on the 
wilderness preservation issue see Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE 
L.J. 205 (1974); 
[Ut is satisfying to ground the protection of the environment on our most 
national legal institution. The right of our citizens to their history, to the signs 
and symbols of their culture, and therefore to some means of protecting and 
using their surroundings in a way consistent with their values is as important 
as the right to an equally apportioned franchise or to participation in a party 
primary. These rights are not to be denied on economic grounds. 
Id. a t  267 (footnotes omitted). 
12. McCloskey 298. 
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camp, fish, water-ski, and sell  concession^.^^ 
The Hetch Hetchy controversy also provided the preserva- 
tionists with a clearer understanding of the political process and 
the ways in which it could be used not only to prevent proposed 
developments in wilderness areas on an ad hoc basis, but also to 
prevent future encroachments on a much broader scale. As a 
result, such prominent preservationists as Aldo Leopold,%obert 
Marshall,I5 and Howard Zahniser,I6 together with an increasing 
number of preservationist groups,I7 enthusiastically supported 
such actions as the Forest Service's decision to set aside and 
preserve certain wilderness areas within the National  forest^,^^ 
and the efforts of the National Park Service to prevent logging, 
mining, and grazing within the national parks and  monument^.'^ 
The ephemeral nature of these administrative efforts, however, 
was not entirely satisfactory. Consequently, the preservationists 
turned their efforts toward achieving more permanent legislative 
controls in the form of a wilderness bill. 
The initial proposals for a wilderness bill in the early 1950's 
met with considerable opposition and were generally unsuccess- 
ful." Something was needed to generate additional public sup- 
port for the preservationist cause, and it came in the form of a 
proposal to construct a dam on the Green River within Dinosaur 
National Monument in Utah.21 Like the Hetch Hetchy Valley 50 
years before,22 the deep, narrow gorge of the Green River was 
13. See, e.g., Association for the Protection of the Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 253 
N.Y. 234, 170 N.E. 902 (1930), where recreationists as well as commercial enterprises set 
forth their views on how part of the wilderness areas in New York should be used. 
14. Aldo Leopold was an ecologist to whom much of the success of the preservationist 
movement in the first half of the 20th century can be attributed. One of his first major 
accomplishments was a successful campaign in the early 1920's for a policy of wilderness 
preservation within the National Forest System. See NASH 182-99. 
15. Marshall founded the Wilderness Society in 1935. Id. a t  200-08. 
16. Zahniser figured prominently in the leadership of the preservationist movement 
in the legislative battles leading up to the enactment of the Wilderness Act of 1964. Id. a t  
219. 
17. The Sierra Club (formed in San Francisco in 1892) and the Wilderness Society 
(founded in the State of Washington in 1935) were the first two preservationist groups. 
Id. a t  132 & 207. 
18. SUNDQUIST 336. 
19. Id. 
20. McCloskey 298. 
21. For a discussion of the entire Colorado River Storage Project see 0. STRATTON & 
P. SLROTKIN, THE ECHO PARK CONTROVERSY 79 (Inter-University Case Program No. 46, 
1959). 
22. The Hetch Hetchy incident was effectively called upon by the conservationists 
to help support their stand. "Before" and "after" photographs were exhibited in a display 
which strikingly contrasted the high, green valleys of the pre-dam Hetch Hetchy Valley 
with the muddy, barren banks of the artificial reservoir. NASH 215. 
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attractive to both reclamationists and preservationists. Since 
many other wilderness areas were threatened by commercial ex- 
ploitation at the time,23 the Echo Park Dam proposal provided a 
focal point for national attention and a forum for airing the posi- 
tions of the opposing sides.24 Although the furor raised over the 
Echo Park Dam did not immediately result in the passage of a 
national wilderness bill, the fact that the Colorado River Storage 
Project finally approved by Congress in 195625 did not include the 
proposed dam was itself a major achievement for the preserva- 
tionists. 
From the Dinosaur National Monument victory, the preser- 
vationists reaffirmed their drive for congressional action to estab- 
lish a national wilderness system. The movement gained substan- 
tial ground in 1956 when Senator Hubert Humphrey inserted a 
speech given by Howard Zahniser, then executive director of the 
Wilderness Society, into the Congressional Record.16 Replies to 
the speech were generally fa~orable,~' and the result was the in- 
23. Nash describes the situation as follows: 
Dams were pending in both Glacier and Grand Canyon National Parks. Los 
Angeles had designs on Kings Canyon, wildest of the National Parks which the 
Sierra Club unsuccessfully sought to have named in John Muir's honor, for a 
source of municipal water supply. In the East, the Adirondack State Park's 
status as wilderness was in jeopardy from plans for dams on the Moose River a t  
Panther and Higley Mountains. 
Id. at 210. 
24. The conservationists mounted a massive campaign. As Nash points out: 
Appealing to the public with flyers, articles, editorials, and open letters, they 
succeeded in arousing a storm of protest. The House mail showed a ratio of those 
who would keep Dinosaur wild to those in favor of the dam of eighty to one. 
Id. at 216. Senator Arthur V. Watkins of Utah provided a good example of the ambivalence 
of many of the individuals involved with the controversy when he stated: 
I am as much interested in beauty, in rugged scenery and preservation of na- 
ture's great wonders [as anyone] . . . but I want to point out . . . that to my 
mind, beautiful farms, homes, industries and a high standard of civilization are 
equally desirable and inspiring. 
Id. a t  211. "Speaker Rayburn said in 1954 that Congressmen had received more mail in 
protest against Echo Park Dam than on any other subject." SUNDQUIST 337. Numerous 
pamphlets and articles were distributed and a professional motion picture was made to 
educate the public concerning the detrimental effects of the proposal on the environment. 
The movement received national attention through popular periodicals and had the back- 
ing of 78 national and 236 state conservation organizations. Id. 
25. NASH 219. A sentence in the Colorado River Storage Project bill states: "[Nlo 
dam or reservoir constructed under the authorization of the Act shall be within any 
National Park or Monument." Id. See also 0. STRATTON A D P. SIROTKIN, THE ECHO PARK 
CONTROVERSY 79 (Inter-University Case Program No. 46, 1959). 
26. SUNDQUIST 337. 
27. Id. 
732 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
troduction of the first wilderness bill (S. 4013) in June of 1956.2R 
The proposed bill was met by strong opposition from such 
commercial groups as the American Pulpwood Association, the 
American National Cattleman's Association, and the American 
Mining Association, who felt that the proposal would either ex- 
clude them from wilderness areas entirely or severely restrict 
their use of these areas. The bill was also opposed by groups of 
recreationists who feared the exclusion of camping and related 
activities from wilderness areas.29 Surprisingly, the Forest Service 
and the National Park Service were also opposed to the proposal, 
which they saw as an attempt to limit their authority to adminis- 
ter the lands within their control.30 The heavy lobbying pressure 
mounted by these interests resulted in the defeat of the initial 
wilderness  proposal^,^' and the Multiple Use Act of 196032 was 
largely a result of compromise over the passage of a satisfactory 
wilderness 
In 1961, the preservationist movement gained substantial 
support when President Kennedy endorsed a proposed wilderness 
bill.34 The net result was that the ensuing congressional debates 
focused primarily on compromises over the authority to add lands 
to the wilderness system, the status of mining and other commer- 
cial activities in wilderness areas, and the initial amount of land 
to be included in the system, rather than on whether the bill 
should be passed a t  all." The bill which finally received Senate 
approval in 1961," however, was radically altered by the House 
Interior Committee under the leadership of Representative 
Wayne Aspinall of color ad^,^^ and died in committee upon ad- 
28. For a discussion of the important Senate and House bills dealing with wilderness 
preservation see McCloskey 298; Mercure 53. 
29. NASH 241. 
30. McCloskey 298; Mercure 53-54. Sundquist quotes a senior forest official as saying, 
"It hurt our pride, to suggest that we had to have our hands tied by law." SUNDQUIST 338. 
31. Mercure 52. 
32. 16 U.S.C. § §  528-31 (1970). The Act designated multiple use and sustained yield 
as firm objectives in the administration of national forest lands and stressed the propriety 
of preserving the natural environment to the fullest possible extent. Id. 5 529. 
33. McCloskey 299; Mercure 52. 
34. McCloskey 299. 
35. Mercure 55. 
36. Id. at 57. 
37. Representative Aspinall, chairman of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Com- 
mittee, represented the views of most western legislators whose constituents included 
substantial mining, timber, and grazing interests. These congressmen were opposed to a 
concept of wilderness preservation which would preclude such activities in wilderness 
areas. Aspinall was also opposed to the presidential authority clauses in several of the 
early bills introduced to his committee. For a more detailed account of the political history 
of the bill see id. a t  57-59. 
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journment of the House in 1962. In 1963 another wilderness bill 
was passed by the Senate only to again meet opposition in the 
House Interior and Insular Affairs C ~ r n m i t t e e . ~ ~  Realizing that a 
wilderness bill would never be passed if concessions were not 
made,39 the preservationists agreed to many of the House Interior 
Committee's demands in exchange for debate on the floor of the 
House where considerable support for the bill e x i ~ t e d . ~ " ~  a
result, the bill passed the House and was subsequently signed 
into law by President Lyndon Johnson on September 3, 1964? 
The provisions of the 1964 Wilderness Act limited the group 
of lands which could be designated as wilderness to national 
forest lands previously classified as "wilderness," "wild," 
6 4 canoe," and "primitive," and to "roadless" areas of more than 
5,000 contiguous acres in national parks, monuments, wildlife 
refuges, and game ranges.43 Wilderness, wild, and canoe areas 
automatically became part of the National Wilderness Preserva- 
tion System (NWPS) upon the effective date of the Act," while 
primitive and roadless areas were to be reviewed by the Secretar- 
ies of Agriculture and the Interior to determine their suitability 
for future inclusion in the NWPS.45 The conclusions of the Secre- 
taries were to be submitted to the President, who, in turn, was 
to make recommendations concerning the lands to Congress for 
final approval.46 Also open to presidential recommendation were 
"any contiguous area[s] of national forest lands predominantly 
38. McCloskey 300. 
39. ~ e ~ a r d i n ;  the concessions made by the preservationists, Mercure states: 
[I]n the fall of 1963 it became obvious to the preservationists that time and 
the realities of congressional power were against them and that it was better to 
get some protection rather than none a t  all. It was also recognized that while 
they had to invest huge amounts of money in an attempt to arouse the public, 




41. 16 U.S.C. 9 0  1131-36 (1970). 
42. It should be noted that this section does not contain an exhaustive discussion of 
all of the provisions of the Wilderness Act, but rather focuses only on those sections 
relevant to this comment. 
43. 16 U.S.C. 9 1132(a)-(c) (1970). 
44. Id. 4 1132(a). The only canoe area was the Boundary Waters Canoe Area in 
Minnesota. As of the effective date of the Act there existed 53 wilderness and wild areas. 
Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 275, 278 (1974). 
45. 16 U.S.C. 4 1132(b)-(c) (1970). 
46. Id. 
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of wilderness value."47 The President was required to submit rec- 
ommendations on one-third of the designated lands within 3 
years, on two-thirds of the lands within 7 years, and on all re- 
maining lands within 10 years.48 
In general, lands designated as wilderness areas are to be free 
from commercial enterprises, roads, any form of motorized or 
mechanized transport, and all manmade  structure^.^^ Economic 
interest groups, however, were successful in obtaining numerous 
exceptions to these strict proscriptions regarding land use within 
national forest wilderness areas. First, where already established, 
use of aircraft and motorboats may continue.50 Second, mineral 
prospecting is allowed as long as it is conducted in a manner 
consistent with wilderness pre~ervation.~' Third, mining and min- 
eral leasing laws will generally continue to apply until December 
31, 1983.52 Fourth, water and power projects are permissible under 
some circumstances, and previously established grazing uses may 
be continued." Fifth, regulations governing the Boundary Waters 
Canoe Area in Minnesota, though less stringent than the strict 
provisions of the Wilderness Act, are to remain in effect.54 Sixth, 
commercial services necessary to the realization of recreational 
and other wilderness purposes are permitted.55 In light of these 
exceptions, the efficacy of the Act in preserving the wilderness 
characteristics of areas included within the NWPS is to a large 
extent dependent upon the manner in which the Departments of 
Agriculture and the Interior, the President, and Congress carry 
out their discretionary responsibilities. 
A. Guidelines for Inclusion of Additional Lands 
The Wilderness Act provided very few guidelines for the De- 
47. The provision of the Wilderness Act pertaining to contiguous areas states: 
Nothing herein contained shall limit the President in proposing, as part of his 
recommendations to Congress, the alteration of existing boundaries of primitive 
areas or recommending the addition of any contiguous area of national forest 
lands predominantly of wilderness value. 
Id. $ 1132(b). 
48. Id. 4 1132(b)-(c). 
49. Id. $ 1133(c). 
50. Id. 4 1133(d)(l). 
51. Id.  4 1133(d)(2). 
52. Id. 4 1133(d)(3). 
53. Id. $ 1133(d)(4). 
54. Id. 4 1133(d)(5). 
55. Id. 4 1133(d)(6). 
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partments of Agriculture and the Interior in their review of lands 
designated for possible inclusion in the NWPS. Apparently, 
Congress was confident that these departments would promul- 
gate their own guidelines and procedures in conformity with the 
Act's general wilderness concept. The criticisms leveled against 
both the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior during 
the 11 years since passage of the however, would suggest 
that this congressional confidence was misplaced for at  least two 
reasons. First, the Act's definition of "wilderness" was not abun- 
dantly clear. Second, the departments charged with administer- 
ing the Act often had objectives and attitudes in conflict with the 
concept of wilderness pre~ervation.~' While it is true that the 
President and Congress are not bound by the recommendations 
of the departments concerning potential wilderness areas, these 
recommendations are generally agreed to be extremely influen- 
tial, and thus many recent criticisms would have been eliminated 
had the Act provided more explicit guidelines for departmental 
review. 
B. Protection of Potential Wilderness Areas Pending Review 
Just as the Act failed to provide specific guidelines for re- 
view, it also failed to specify the uses to be permitted in potential 
wilderness areas pending review by the departments and recom- 
mendations by the President and C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~  This problem was 
- 
56. See generally Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 275 
(1974). 
57. Indeed, one of the factors behind the initial movement for legislative regulation 
of this area was the preservationists' concern that administrative discretion was too unpre- 
dictable to provide consistency and fairness in the administration of wilderness areas. See 
Note, Parker u. United States: The Forest Service Role in Wilderness Preservation, 3 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 145, 147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Parker v. United States]. 
58. The Forest Service included its regulations in The Forest Service Manual. A 
Roadless Area Review Evaluation (RARE) program was devised which provides for review 
of "all roadless areas 5,000 acres or larger in the National Forest System as well as smaller 
roadless areas which are contiguous to existing primitive areas or wildernesses." See note 
76 and accompanying text infra. The Interior Department attempted to incorporate the 
wilderness reviews within its master plan study for all areas in the National Park System. 
See generally Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 275, 287 
(1974); The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING WILDERNESS MAGAZINE 38 (1975). 
Many of the areas mandated for review by the Wilderness Act are also protected by 
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. $ 9  4321, 
4331-35, 4341-47 (1970). See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972) 
(enjoining timber cutting in 55 million acres of "de facto wilderness" until environmental 
impact statements were completed). But the protection given by NEPA to potential 
wilderness areas is not as complete as that offered by the Wilderness Act. For example, 
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discussed in Parker v. United States,59 in which a group of con- 
cerned preservationists challenged the right of the United States 
Forest Service to permit the cutting of timber in an area adjoining 
the Gore Range Eagles Nest Primitive Area in color ad^.^^ Since 
the area in dispute was contiguous to a primitive area, the plain- 
tiffs contended that it was entitled to review for possible wilder- 
ness designation and that no nonwilderness uses could be permit- 
ted within the area pending review? The United States District 
Court for the District of Colorado agreed and granted an injunc- 
tion against the cutting of timber in the area on grounds that the 
power of the President and Congress to include additional lands 
within the NWPS would be jeopardized if the Forest Service were 
allowed to impair the wilderness condition of the area before pro- 
per review procedures were ~ o m p l e t e d . ~ ~  
The district court in Parker recognized that not all areas 
contiguous to national forests were intended to be reviewed under 
the Act, but only those areas "which seem to have significant 
wilderness resour~es?~ Accordingly, the court found that the dis- 
puted area possessed sufficient wilderness characteristics to merit 
its protection against such nonwilderness uses as timber cutting 
pending review by the Department of Agriculture? This "mini- 
mum suitability" test was not intended to provide the ultimate 
criteria for determining whether the area should be designated as 
wilderness, but rather was designed to indicate whether the area 
possessed sufficient wilderness characteristics to merit its preser- 
vation pending review.65 
- 
environmental impact statements are only required when there exists a major federal 
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) 
(1970). There are certainly many nonwilderness activities which do not constitute major 
federal actions. 
59. 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), a f d ,  448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 
405 U.S. 989 (1972). 
60. The area was known as the East Meadow Creek Basin and consisted of approxi- 
mately 3,000 acres. Id. a t  595. 
61. Id. a t  594. 
62. Id. a t  599. The court found that it was "crystal clear from the evidence that the 
consummation of the present sale will effectively take all of East Meadow Creek out of 
contention as a primitive or wilderness addition." Id. a t  596. 
63. Id. at 599. The District Court applied the Forest Service's own regulations which 
state: "Each Primitive Area . . . and contiguous lands which seem to have significant 
wilderness resources will be studied . . . . US. D E ~ .  OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE 
MANUAL § 2321 (1) ." Id. (emphasis added). 
64. Id. a t  601. 
65. The court stated: 
However, we are not here concerned with the issue of whether or not the 
Forest Service must recommend East Meadow Creek for wilderness classifica- 
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On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court's order that the Forest Service restudy and include 
recommendations concerning the disputed area in its report to 
the President? Like the district court, the court of appeals per- 
ceived its role in determining the suitability of the area for wilder- 
ness preservation as entirely preliminary. As stated by the court: 
This requirement [to preserve the area until final determi- 
nation of its suitability for wilderness preservation] in no way 
directs or limits the Secretary in his full discretionary right to 
make such recornommendation [sic] to the President as he 
may deem proper.67 
Thus, the Parker decision made it clear that all lands specified 
in the Act for wilderness review, including contiguous lands with 
significant wilderness characteristics, would be protected from 
nonwilderness uses pending review. 
The Parker decision also shed some light on the meaning of 
the term "contiguous." In rejecting the contention that the pres- 
ence of a narrow "bumper" zone" between the area in dispute and 
the Gore Range Eagles Nest Primitive Area made the disputed 
area noncontiguous, the Tenth Circuit indicated that i t  is not 
crucial that an area share a common boundary with a primitive 
region to be classified as contiguous. The Parker decision may be 
limited to its specific facts, however, and in the absence of a 
definition within the Act itself, the problem of identifying contig- 
uous areas remains unres01ved.~~ 
tion. Nor would we undertake to second guess the Secretary by a ruling that the 
area in question is wilderness. 
Id. a t  600. 
66. 448 F.2d 793, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972). 
67. Id. a t  797. It  has been suggested that the circuit court did not clearly use the 
"minimum suitability" test set out by the district court. See Note, Parker v.  United States 
163. It is clear, however, that the circuit court did not intend to make the ultimate decision 
regarding the wilderness suitability of the area in dispute. 
68. The "bumper" zone was created when the Forest Service reduced the number of 
board feet in the contract for the sale of timber in the region, thereby eliminating the lands 
immediately adjacent to the primitive area from a direct relationship with the proposed 
contract. The court states that "[tlhe preservation of a 'bumper' area does not probe the 
basic question presented, merely serves to lessen the impact of the agency action, and does 
not justify such action [as timber cutting] if otherwise prohibited." 448 F.2d a t  796. 
69. See Note, Parker v.  United States 164. The author of the foregoing note suggests 
that: 
The Service should review the entire scope of the next manageable ecological 
unit adjoining a primitive area, excluding that unit or portions of it from study, 
report and interim protection only when the impact of man is substantial 
enough to preclude the entire area or portion excluded from meeting the 
minimum suitability test. 
Id. 
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Parker also failed to define the point a t  which the Forest 
Service's duty to protect a contiguous area ends. Although the 
injunction continued "until a final determination has been made 
by Congress," neither the circuit nor the district court expressly 
considered this issue. However, since the President may continue 
to make recommendations until final action has been taken by 
C o n g r e ~ s , ~ ~  it would appear only logical that contiguous areas 
should be protected as long as there is a possibility for inclusion 
in the NWPS.71 
C. Lands Not Included 
Much of the potentially suitable wilderness land owned by 
the Federal Government was not specifically designated for re- 
view under the Wilderness The effect of this omission was 
forcefully demonstrated in Sierra Club v. Hardin,73 in which the 
United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that 
an estimated 1,090,000 acres of Forest Service land possessing 
obvious wilderness characteristics were not entitled to protection 
under the Wilderness Act because: 
The Act expressly provides that "no Federal lands shall be 
designated as 'wilderness areas' except as provided for in this 
chapter or by subsequent Act." 16 U.S.C. 5 1131(a) (Supp. 
1970). Since there were no "primitive" areas in Alaska on Sep- 
tember 3, 1964, and i t  does not appear that the sale includes any 
land within a national park, wildlife refuge or game range, the 
Wilderness Act has no application here.74 
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b)-(c) (1970). 
71. Predictably, the Forest Service chose to read the Parker decision narrowly. The 
"minimum suitability" language of the district court was rejected in favor of "predomi- 
nantly of wilderness value" criteria in departmental memoranda issued subsequent to the 
Parker decision. Note, Parker u. United States 168. Also, "in a recent administrative 
ruling of the Department of Agriculture [the Forest Service] indicated that it would 
refuse to follow Parker outside the 10th Circuit." Id. at  168 n.105. Despite this narrow 
interpretation of Parker by the Forest Service, the decision already has had some statutory 
effect and placed conservationists in a better position a t  the bargaining table. Id. at  168- 
69. 
72. No provision was made, for example, for the review of lands under the control of 
the Bureau of Land Management, the Government's largest land supervisor. It would thus 
appear that the Act, which many conservationists had hoped would provide a comprehen- 
sive system for wilderness preservation, has forgotten one rather essential ingredient- 
land. 
73. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971). 
74. Id. at 124. The problem pointed out in Hardin has been partially eliminated in 
Alaska by the establishment of huge park and wildlife reservations within the National 
Park System pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § §  1601 
et. seq. (Supp. 1970). 
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As a result of this failure to explicitly provide for review of 
all potentially suitable lands, it is necessary to turn to a rather 
obscure section of the Act to find some authority for including 
lands not specifically designated for review within the NWPS. 
Section 6 of the Act allows the Secretaries of Agriculture and the 
Interior to make recommendations in their annual reports to Con- 
gress concerning "any" areas deemed suitable for wilderness pres- 
e r ~ a t i o n . ~ ~  Although such recommendations are completely dis- 
cretionary, it appears that the departments have not totally ig- 
nored their authority to review lands other than those specifically 
designated in the Act. The Forest Service has implemented a 
"Roadless Area Review and Evaluation" program which provides 
for review of "all roadless areas 5,000 acres or larger in the Na- 
tional Forest System as well as smaller roadless areas which are 
contiguous to existing Primitive Areas or Wilderne~ses."~VI'he 
Interior Department has also implemented a program to review 
all areas with possible wilderness p~tential . '~ Similarly, Congress 
on its own initiative has occasionally designated areas as wilder- 
ness which have not been set aside for review by the 
Thus, although the Act does not explicitly provide'for review 
of all lands with wilderness potential, it appears that a t  least 
some areas not designated for review by the Act are receiving 
attention through administrative and legislative action. It never- 
theless seems anomalous that such actions should be necessary 
to bring areas with significant wilderness characteristics into the 
NWPS. This criticism does not necessarily imply that more lands 
should be included within the wilderness system, but only that 
it may be more beneficial to initially provide for the study of all 
potentially suitable lands so that when the optimum amount of 
wilderness acreage has been set aside, that acreage will include 
the areas best suited for p rese r~a t ion .~~  
75. 16 U.S.C. 5 1136 (1970). 
76. U.S. FOREST SERVICE CI REPORT NO. 11, NEW WILDERNESS STUDY AREAS, a t  2 
(1973). 
77. The Point Reyes National Seashore Wilderness Area, comprising more than 
10,000 acres of California seashore including several "roaded" areas, is an example of the 
additional areas being considered by the Interior Department. See Buell, The Wilderness 
Act and the National Wildlife Refuges and Ranges, in WILDERNESS AND THE QUALITY OF 
LIFE 6, 26-27 (1969). 
78. An example of a congressionally initiated wilderness area is the Sawtooth Wilder- 
ness Area in Idaho. See Haight, The Wilderness Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 275, 
284-85 (1974). 
79. For a discussion concerning the concept of an optimal amount of wilderness 
acreage see notes 146-48 and accompanying text infra. 
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IV. WHAT'S BEEN DONE~O 
Since passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964, some 144 areas 
totaling more than 13 million acres in the National Forest, Na- 
tional Park, and National Wildlife Refuge Systems have been 
added to the National Wildlife Preservation System through con- 
gressional enactments. As of January 1, 1976, 104 wilderness 
areas in the national forestsu1 and 40 wilderness areas in the na- 
tional parks and national wildlife refuges had been created.R2 
When the Act was passed in 1964, 34 primitive areas within 
the National Forest System were mandated for review. All 34 
have now been studied by the Forest Service under the direction 
of the Secretary of Agriculture. Sixteen of these areas have been 
incorporated into the NWPS, while the 18 remaining areas await 
congressional action.u3 The Act also required the Department of 
the Interior to review 186 areas in the National Park System, the 
National Wildlife Refuges, and the Migratory Bird Refuges for 
wilderness suitability. As of January 1, 1976, 40 units involving 
over 750,000 acres had been added to the NWPSu4 and 112 units 
comprising 10.5 million additional acres had been reviewed and 
await congressional action? 
The above figures indicate that the reviews mandated by the 
Wilderness Act have been accomplished in reasonable proximity 
to the Act's 10-year deadline. To be sure, the start was slow, with 
only 8 areas finding their way into the NWPS in the first 6 years, 
but the finish has been strong with 48 units being added in 1974 
alone? It may also be noted that no deadlines were set for con- 
gressional action and over 110 areas which have received depart- 
mental review now await final approval.87 
It would therefore appear that the Act has worked admirably 
well. Although there may be disagreement as to whether too little 
or too much acreage was finally included in wilderness areas, the 
80. Statistics in this section were obtained from The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING 
WILDERNESS MAGAZINE 38 (1975) and from information received from the Department of 
the Interior, the United States Forest Service, and the House and Senate Committees on 
Interior and Insular Affairs. 
81. See appendix A infra. 
82. See appendices BI & CI infra. 
83. The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING WILDERNESS MAGAZINE 42 (1975). 
84. See appendices BI & CI infra. 
85. See appendices BII & CII infra. 
86. See appendices A, BI, & CI infra. Of course, 54 wilderness areas were included 
in the NWPS concurrently with the passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964. 
87. See appendices BII & CII infra. 
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study of the lands designated for review has largely been com- 
pleted. 
The Act's concept of wilderness governs determinations of 
which lands are to be included in the NWPS as well as decisions 
concerning how those lands are to be administered. Although the 
wilderness concept has worked fairly well, at  least if lack of litiga- 
tion is any indication of succe~s,8~ there have been some problems 
resulting from its vagaries, and increased pressure for future de- 
velopment of wilderness lands could create additional problems 
if the concept is not clarified. 
The Act includes provisions which alternately illuminate and 
cloud the wilderness concept. Section 2(a) indicates that it is the 
policy of Congress to "secure for the American people of present 
and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of 
wilderness" by preserving and protecting lands "in their natural 
condi t i~n ."~~ Section 2(c), entitled "Definition of Wilderness," 
indicates that wilderness is an area "untrammeled by man, where 
man himself is a visitor who does not remain," an area retaining 
its "primeval character and influence, without permanent im- 
provements or human habitation, which is protected and man- 
aged so as to preserve its natural  condition^."^^ To this point the 
definition unequivocally refers only to lands which are "untram- 
meled," "primeval, " and "natural. "gl However, section 2(c) also 
includes land: 
which (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by 
the forces of nature, with the  imprint  of man's work 
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities 
for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) 
has a t  least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as 
to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired 
condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological or 
other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical 
value .92 
88. A survey by the authors of the case law involving the Wilderness Act has revealed 
relatively little litigation. However, it must be recognized with respect to environmental 
litigation that large legal expenses and the generally nonexistent prospect of financial 
reward may tend to discourage potential plaintiffs. 
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1970). 
90. Id. § 1131(c). 
91. McCloskey 307. 
92. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1970) (emphasis added). 
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Points (2) through (4) of this definition seem consistent with the 
unqualified notion of "natural condition," but point (1) suggests 
a more lenient wilderness concept-one watered down by the 
qualifiers "generally," "primarily," and "s~bstantial ly."~~ Al-
though point (1) has been interpreted by the Forest Service to 
require a "pristine appearance with no evidence of man's activi- 
ties whats~ever ,"~~ it appears that this interpretation is stricter 
than Congress intended. Section 4 of the Act, dealing with the use 
of wilderness areas, commences with the general rule that "there 
shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within 
any wilderness area,"g5 but goes on to permit several commercial 
and recreational uses which would require mechanized trans- 
port,96 as well as the continuation of previously established graz- 
ing a c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~  Thus, notwithstanding its definition of wilderness 
as an area untrammeled by man, Congress clearly expected less 
than purity to prevail in many of the areas included within the 
NWPS. 
The difficulties in interpreting the wilderness concept have 
arisen in deciding how much impurity to allow. Uses such as 
grazing, motorboating, and flying light aircraft may be justified 
under the Act's wilderness concept because their effects on the 
natural environment are relatively limited. However, other uses 
permitted under section 4, such as mining and logging, substan- 
tially alter the natural conditions of the land and would therefore 
appear to be basically incompatible with wilderness preserva- 
tion .98 
The suggestion that mining is incompatible with wilderness 
preservation is supported by the legislative history of the wilder- 
ness bill.g9 The House Report on the bill indicates that "prospect- 
ing for mineral or other resources would be allowed if so con- 
ducted as to be compatible with the preservation of a wilderness 
e n v i r ~ n m e n t . " ~ ~ ~  Yet, in a remarkable bit of doubletalk, the Re- 
port also explains that "[c]urrently authorized uses that are 
incompatible with wilderness preservation should be phased out 
over a reasonable period of time"lOl and points out tha t  the 
93. McCloskey 307. 
94. The Wilderness System, 41 LIVING WILDERNESS MAGAZINE 38, 42 (1975). 
95. 16 U.S.C. 4 1133(c) (1970). 
96. Id. 4 1133(~)-(d). 
97. Id. 5 1133(d)(4). 
98. See notes 105 & 121 and accompanying text infra. 
99. H.R. REP. NO. 1538, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 
15381. 
100. H.R. REP. 1538 at  8. 
101. Id. a t  9. 
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applicability of mining and mineral leasing laws is to be limited 
to a period of 25 years.lo2 The only possible conclusion that may 
be drawn from these statements is that mining would not be 
phased out if it were not incompatible with the concept of wilder- 
ness. 
This conclusion is further supported by the decision in Izaak 
Walton League of America v. St. Clair.lo3 In St. Clair the defen- 
dant, with the permission of the Government, undertook surface 
mineral exploration in conjunction with his mineral rights in land 
within the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA), a part of the 
NWPS. The Izaak Walton League sought an injunction to pre- 
vent St. Clair from continuing his operation. In a noteworthy 
opinion, Judge Neville of the United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota granted the injunction,lo4 stating: 
A Wilderness purpose plain and simply has to be inconsistent 
with and antagonistic to a purpose to allow any commercial 
activity such as mining within the BWCA . . . . In this court's 
opinion, the Wilderness objectives override the contrary mineral 
right provision of the statute (and of necessity the regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto). Otherwise, the Congressional 
Act is a nullity. It does not seem to this court that i t  can pre- 
sume that Congress intended a nullity.lo5 
Although St. Clair was later reversed on procedural grounds,lo6 it 
is indicative of probable future constructions of the Wilderness 
Act with regard to mining and other uses permitted by the Act 
which are inconsistent with wilderness preservation. 
Judge Neville's virtual nullification of the provision permit- 
ting mining seems to be legitimate. I t  appears that "the rule now 
generally approved is that a proviso which is directly repugnant 
to the purview or body of the act is inoperative and void for 
102. Id. 
103. 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), rev'd and remanded, 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 
1974). 
104. Id. a t  716. 
105. Id. a t  714-15. 
106. 497 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1974). The ground for reversal was primary jurisdiction. 
The court determined that prior to any further judicial disposition of the case the Forest 
Service would have to decide whether or not to issue St.  Clair a permit to mine in the 
BWCA. As of this writing, St. Clair has not made application for a permit, and thus the 
Forest Service has made no ruling. The federal defendants have filed a motion to dismiss 
in the district court, arguing that the case is moot given the failure of St.  Clair to apply 
for a permit. The court has taken no action because neither party has moved to place the 
case on the court's calendar. It appears, however, that the mootness contention will not 
prevail since the opportunity exists for St. Clair to apply for a permit a t  any time in the 
future. See generally 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 181. 
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repugnancy. " lo7 As Judge Neville indicates, an extensive mining 
operation cannot be conducted in a manner consistent with wil- 
derness preservation.los Therefore, under the above-quoted rule of 
construction, the proviso permitting mining becomes inoperative. 
Another recently decided case, Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group v. Butz,loQ indicates that logging is also incom- 
patible with wilderness preservation.l1° In the first of two suits, 
the plaintiffs sought an  injunction prohibiting logging in the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area until all of the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)lll had been satisfied 
by the Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service.l12 The 
plaintiffs later filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent 
injunction against logging in the virgin forest areas of the BWCA 
based on the express requirement of the Wilderness Act that the 
Secretary of Agriculture maintain the primitive character of the 
area.l13 The defendants claimed that NEPA must be construed in 
light of the special Wilderness Act provision concerning the 
BWCA which required it to be administered "without unneces- 
sary restrictions on other uses, including that of timber."l14 The 
court concluded that a restriction on logging could be challenged 
as "unnecessary" only if i t  were shown not to be essential to 
maintaining the primitive character of the BWCA.l15 The court 
held that a permanent injunction against logging in the BWCA 
107. 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes 8 321 (1974). See 82 C.J.S. Statutes 9 381 (1953). 
108. As stated in the opinion: 
There can be no question but that full mineral development and mining will 
destroy and negate the wilderness or most of it. Even any substantial explora- 
tory operation such as core drilling will require a means of ingress and egress, a 
communications system of some kind, the establishment of various camp sites, 
the importation of food, clothing, etc., power lines and the modification to a 
greater or lesser extent of the environemnt. Should minerals be discovered in 
commercially productive quantities and be amenable to open pit mining as in 
other locations in Minnesota or as in taconite sites, the purpose and values of 
almost the entire BWCA is lost. The same is true, but to somewhat lesser degree, 
should any mining be done in the conventional underground method. In either 
event, access as by railroad or highway is necessary, areas of timber must be 
logged off, a water supply must be obtained and other wilderness interferences 
effected. 
353 F. Supp. a t  714. 
109. No. 4-72 Civil 598 (D. Minn., Aug. 13, 1975). 
110. Id. at  94. 
111. 42 U.S.C. # $  4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1970). 
112. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 587 (D. 
Minn. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
113. Id. at  587-88. 
114. 16 U.S.C. 9 1133(d)(5) (1970). 
115. 358 F. Supp. a t  629. 
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would be granted if it were shown in an environmental impact 
statement, which the Forest Service was ordered to prepare, that 
"logging irretrievably destroys the character of the area in- 
volved. " l6 The court also enjoined the defendants from logging 
"in those areas of the active timber sales on the BWCA which are 
contiguous with the main virgin forest areas of the BWCA pend- 
ing the Forest Service's completion of i t s  . . . impact  
statement." 117 The appellate court affirmed. 118 
Upon completion of the impact statement, plaintiffs brought 
a second suit in the district court alleging that the impact state- 
ment prepared by the Forest Service did not comply with NEPA 
and reasserting the claim that logging would destroy the primi- 
tive character of the region.llg The court found the impact state- 
ment to be inadequate.120 This finding would ordinarily require 
the court to order further study before issuing a permanent in- 
junction. However, since there was substantial evidence that 
"logging in virgin forest areas destroys the primitive character of 
the area logged,"121 the court, relying on the provisions of the 
Wilderness Act, permanently enjoined logging in the virgin for- 
ests and areas contiguous thereto within the BWCA.122 Having 
granted an injunction against logging pursuant to the Wilderness 
Act, the court concluded that further study under NEPA would 
be superfluous. 123 
The court also denied defendant's counterclaim for a 
declaratory judgment that a total proscription of logging within 
the BWCA, including previously logged areas,12* would be unlaw- 
ful under the Wilderness The court agreed that "logging 
within previously logged-over areas does not have as much of an 
adverse effect on the primitive character of the area as does log- 
116. Id. 
117. Id. a t  630. 
118. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). 
119. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, No. 4-72 Civil 598 at  2. 
120. Id. a t  79-82. 
121. Id. a t  94. 
122. Id. a t  99. 
123. Id. a t  97. 
124. Ordinarily logged-over areas would not be included within the NWPS. 
[Tlhe special BWCA provision of the Wilderness Act was necessary to afford 
the BWCA the same protection as other wilderness areas although the area did 
not conform with the statute's proposed definition of wilderness. Past timber 
harvesting disqualified the BWCA as a wilderness under the proposed definition 
and rather than dilute that definition, the special BWCA provision was written 
to include the BWCA within the protection of the Wilderness Act. 
Id. at  87. 
125. Id. a t  96. 
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ging in virgin forest areas,"126 but nevertheless concluded that the 
disruptive effect of logging even in previously logged areas would 
be "sufficient to justify eliminating all BWCA logging a t  the dis- 
cretion of the Secretary of Agriculture." 12' Thus, the court also 
suggests that even where logging has been established in a wilder- 
ness area prior to its inclusion within the NWPS,128 continued 
logging should be prohibited to allow nature to slowly restore the 
wilderness character of the area. 
The St. Clair and Butz cases demonstrate that at  least two 
activities permitted by the special provisions in section 4 of the 
Act, i. e. , mining and logging, are incompatible with the wilder- 
ness concept and should be disallowed. Other uses mentioned in 
section 4 which seem incompatible with wilderness preservation 
are: "oil and gas leasing, discovery work, drilling, . . . produc- 
t i ~ n , " ' ~ ~  "prospecting for water resources, the establishment and 
maintenance of reservoirs, water-conservation works, power pro- 
jects, transmission lines, . . . other facilities needed in the public 
interest, including road construction and maintenance essential 
to development and use thereof,"130 and "commercial services 
. . . to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for 
realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the 
areas."131 
The wilderness concept which governs inclusion and admin- 
istration of lands within the NWPS has been unclear because of 
seemingly contradictory provisions in sections 2 and 4 of the Act. 
Section 2 provides a general wilderness definition which requires 
lands designated as wilderness to be characterized by essentially 
primeval conditions.132 Section 4, which prescribes activities per- 
missible in wilderness areas, provides a strict general rule which 
appears to be compatible with section 2,133 but also contains spe- 
cial provisions allowing uses seemingly incompatible with wilder- 
ness pre~ervati0n.l~~ The conflicts between these sections can be 
resolved, however, by allowing the sections to work together while 
emphasizing the Act's overall objective of "securing for the Amer- 
ican people of present and future generations the benefits of an 
126. Id. at 95. 
127. Id. at 96. 
128. See note 124 supra. 
129. 16 U.S.C. 9 1133(d)(3) (1970). 
130. Id. § 1133(d)(4). 
131. Id. § 1133(d)(6). 
132. Id. 8 1131(c). 
133. Id. § 1133(c). 
134. Id. 5 1133(d). 
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enduring resource of wilderness."135 Portions of section 4 illustrate 
situations in which the section 2 concept may be applied leni- 
ently, while section 2 provides general guidelines for constraining 
uses permitted under section 4.136 For example, section 4 provi- 
sions allowing activities which only nominally disturb the wilder- 
ness, such as grazing and motor-boating, suggest that absolute 
purity is not required by the section 2 definition.13' Still, the 
emphasis of section 2 on preservation of natural conditions sug- 
gests that commercial enterprises allowed by section 4, such as 
mining and logging, should not be permitted if they substantially 
alter the wilderness character of lands in which they are under- 
taken.138 By this interpretation some section 4 uses may never be 
permissible within the wilderness system. 139 
VI. CAN A STRICT WILDERNESS CONCEPT BE JUSTIFIED? 
The courts are required to resolve current inconsistencies in 
the Wilderness Act by virtually nullifying certain of its provi- 
sions. Congress can remove this responsibility from the courts by 
amending the Act to either eliminate uses which are incompatible 
with the current wilderness concept, change the concept of wil- 
derness so that presently incompatible uses would be permissible 
under its provisions, or adopt a two-tiered wilderness system 
which would provide for pure wilderness in some areas and lim- 
ited commercial development in others. In evaluating the relative 
merit of these alternatives, policymakers would probably rely on 
a cost-benefit analysis.140 This technique evaluates the benefits of 
a project to an affected group in terms of the utility provided by 
the project (generally measured in dollars)141 which would not 
135. Id. 5 1131(a). 
136. Despite the fact that several special uses permitted by section 4 of the Act clearly 
seem to be incompatible with the general wilderness concept which emerges from section 
2, some commentators have suggested that section 2 provides lenient criteria for determin- 
ing whether lands should be included within the NWPS while section 4 contains strict 
guidelines for management of lands once they are admitted into the system. The Wilder- 
ness System, 41 LIVING WILDERNESS MAGAZINE 38, 44 (1975). See Haight, The Wilderness 
Act: Ten Years After, 3 ENV. AFFAIRS 275, 288 (1974). However, the fact that section 4 uses 
discussed above would probably disqualify an area from inclusion within the NWPS under 
section 2 criteria casts doubt on this suggestion. 
137. See notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text supra. 
138. See notes 98-137 and accompanying text supra. 
139. See note 105 and accompanying text supra. 
140. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis techniques see A. HARBERGER, P OJECT 
EVALUATION. 
141. Since cost-benefit analysis is a quantitative aid to decisionmaking, it is neces- 
sary to use some unit of measure to quantify the costs and benefits being considered in 
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accrue to the group but for the project. The costs of the project 
are based on the u$ility which would be foregone (again measured 
in dollars) as a result of not employing the resources involved in 
the project in their next best alternative use.142 
All projects entail both present and future benefits and costs. 
Since people generally prefer present to future benefits and future 
to present costs, the future costs and benefits of a project are 
generally "weighted" through a process referred to as "discount- 
ing" to approximate their "present" value equivalents. In a pro- 
ject involving decisions affecting the general public, however, it 
may be argued that the interests of future generations should be 
weighted as heavily as the interests of the present generation, 
making the discounting process unnecessary. In any event, once 
all costs and benefits of a project in each year have been esti- 
mated, the net present value of the project may be calculated-a 
positive value indicating that the project is justifiable and a nega- 
tive value indicating that it should be abandoned.143 
This section will suggest factors (both pecuniary and nonpe- 
cuniary) which policymakers should consider in performing a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine which of the proposed wilder- 
ness concepts should be adopted and will conclude with a tenta- 
tive recommendation for a wilderness concept based on the fac- 
tors presented. 
A.  Factors To Be Considered in Performing a Cost-Benefit 
A nalysis 
For purposes of this discussion, a leniently managed wilder- 
ness system will be assumed to be the next best alternative to a 
strictly managed system, and no attempt will be made to com- 
pare either of these alternatives with a system allowing large- 
the analysis. This measure usually has been the dollar, which is easily applied to pecuni- 
ary benefits and costs, but applied only with difficulty to nonpecuniary benefits and costs. 
142. This measurement is referred to as the "opportunity cost" of the project. 
143. A common symbolic formulation of a cost-benefit analysis follows: 
n 
B, - C, B, - C, C - ( B i - C i )  
NPV = (B - C , )  + -+ -------- + ... + - 
l + r  ( l + r l Z  ( 1 + r ) "  i = O  ( l + r ) l  
In this equation, B n  = benefits in the nth year of the project, Cn = costs in the nth year, 
r = discount rate, n = number of years over which the project is to be evaluated, and NPV 
= net present value of the project. Benefits and costs are estimated over the life of a 
project. An r is chosen which appropriately weights present against future costs and 
benefits. If the values of B, C, and r produce NPV >0, then the project should be under- 
taken. If a public decision is being made, and discounting is felt to be unnecessary, the 
discount rate will be zero (r = 0). 
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scale commercial development. (For present purposes, a strictly 
managed system will be defined as one allowing only pure wilder- 
ness uses permitted under the present Act, and a leniently man- 
aged wilderness system will be defined as one allowing the incom- 
patible uses permitted under the present Act.) Given this as- 
sumption, by performing a cost-benefit analysis of a strict wilder- 
ness concept, the merits of strictly and leniently managed sys- 
tems can be compared. The pecuniary benefits of a strict concept 
would be measured primarily in terms of the income which would 
be imputed to recreational, educational, and scientific use1" of 
strictly managed lands above that which could be imputed to the 
same activities in the same lands under a lenient concept. The 
pecuniary costs would be the income foregone from such activities 
as mining, logging, water reclamation, and power production.lu 
A strictly pecuniary cost-benefit analysis of the value of wilder- 
ness preservation will result in the conclusion that the creation 
of the National Wilderness Preservation System, with wilderness 
strictly defined, is justified when pecuniary benefits outweigh 
pecuniary costs for the amount of acreage ~0nsidered. l~~ 
The magnitude of costs and benefits associated with a wil- 
derness concept is greatly influenced by the relative scarcities of 
the goods which can be derived from wilderness lands. Lands 
which are potentially includable in the NWPS may be enjoyed 
either in a pristine or a commercially developed state. Goods 
associated with enjoyment of pristine wilderness will be called 
pristine goods. Goods associated with commercial development 
will be called commercial goods. Increasing the amount of land 
committed to a strictly managed wilderness sytem increases the 
amount of pristine goods and decreases the amount of commer- 
cial goods available for public consumption. By the law of dimin- 
ishing returns,14' each additional acre added to a strictly managed 
144. These uses are proposed in 16 U.S.C. $ 1131(c)(4) (1970); Id. $ 1133(b). See 
generally Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, No. 4-72 Civil 598 a t  44. For 
a discussion of the benefits of wilderness preservation see note 4 supra. 
145. These uses are mentioned in 16 U.S.C. 6 1133(d) (1970) and are discussed in the 
previous section of this comment. 
146. The analysis undertaken in this discussion may be represented by the following 
equation: 
n 
N P V = >  ( B i - C i )  
i=o 
B = benefits accruing from strictly managed wilderness. C = benefits accruing from 
leniently managed wilderness. n = number of years over which benefits and costs are 
expected. 
147. According to the law of diminishing returns, each additional unit of a good 
consumed, ceteris paribus, provides less utility than the previous unit. 
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wilderness system provides the public with fewer benefits than 
the previous acre added because it contains pristine goods pos- 
sessing decreased marginal benefits. At the same time, each addi- 
tional acre is added with increased costs, since each addition 
causes commercial goods possessing increased marginal benefits 
to be withheld from consumption. It follows then that if preserva- 
tion of lands as strictly managed wilderness is justified a t  all, 
there is some optimal amount of wilderness acreage beyond which 
the cost of preservation is greater than the benefit.148 
Two commentators, Laurence Tribe and Mark Sagoff, have 
suggested nonpecuniary benefits of a strict wilderness concept 
which should be added to the pecuniary benefits already men- 
tioned.14"oth present their ideas to get away from a utilitarian 
(cost-benefit) justification for wilderness protection which they 
fear will be too ephemeral to justify permanently preserving our 
natural environs.lW Although, as will be shown, neither seems to 
succeed in his effort to escape utilitarianism, each points out 
benefits which should be included in any cost-benefit analysis. 
In Ways Not To  Think About Plastic Trees: New Founda- 
tions for Environmental Law,lJ1 Tribe argues that a "homocentric 
want-oriented perspective,"lJ2 which Sagoff correctly labels utili- 
tarian,153 must be abandoned if a permanent basis for wilderness 
preservation is to be Tribe maintains that this homocen- 
tric perspective leads the environmentalist into the trap of "artic- 
ulating environmental goals wholly in terms of human needs and 
preferences."lJ5 His concern is that as human wants and needs 
148. This type of analysis may also be used to suggest an optimal amount of leniently 
managed wilderness land. 
149. Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974) [here- 
inafter cited as Sagoff]; Tribe, Ways Not  T o  Think About Plastic Trees: New Founda- 
tions for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tribe]. 
While a t  first glance it may appear that one of the most important nonpecuniary 
justifications for wilderness preservation is beauty, Sagoff argues that "[elven if nature 
in the rough were beautiful, this would not be an adequate reason to protect it from 
development." Sagoff 245. Tribe also suggests that the appearance of the natural environ- 
ment will not provide a justification for saving it. Tribe 1316 (plastic trees can provide 
most people with the feeling they are experiencing nature). Beauty therefore will not be 
discussed as a nonpecuniary reason for wilderness preservation. 
150. See  notes 154 & 163 and accompanying text infra. 
151. Tribe. 
152. The homocentric want-oriented perspective is that value system which treats 
human needs and desires as the ultimate frame of reference for making social decisions 
and which Sagoff correctly labels utilitarian. See note 153 infra. 
153. Sagoff 215. 
154. Tribe 1331. 
155. Id. at 1330. 
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presently filled by the wilderness become artificially satisfied our 
commitment to wilderness preservation will erode. He therefore 
suggests that a more enduring basis for preserving the natural 
environment is needed and proposes that one can be found in the 
interests of nonhuman entities. 15' 
But considering nonhuman interests does not result in a non- 
utilitarian justification for wilderness preservation. Instead, non- 
human interests merely comprise another variable to be included 
in the utility calculus.158 While these interests ought to be given 
some weight and would undoubtedly weigh in favor of preserva- 
tion, they are at  best difficult to calculate and can only be calcu- 
lated by human beings who will use them to promote human 
interests. Thus, they are subject to the same weaknesses as the 
human wants and needs Tribe disparages as justifications for 
protection efforts. 1 5 ~  
Sagoff, in On Preserving the Natural E n v i r ~ n m e n t , ~ ~ ~  pre- 
sents a different justification for wilderness preservation:lsl 
Preserving an environment may be compared to maintaining an 
institution, for symbols are to values as institutions are to our 
legal and political life. The obligation to preserve nature, then, 
156. Tribe states: 
By treating individual human need and desire as the ultimate frame of 
reference, and by assuming that human goals and ends must be taken as exter- 
nally "given" (whether physiologically or culturally or both) rather than gener- 
icated by reason, environmental policy makes a value judgment of enormous sig- 
nificance. And, once that judgment has been made, any claim for the continued 
existence of threatened wilderness areas or endangered species must rest on the 
identification of human wants and needs which would be jeopardized by a 
disputed development. As our capacity increases to satisfy those needs and 
wants artifically, the claim becomes tenuous indeed. 
Id. a t  1326. 
157. Id. at 1345. 
158. See id. As Sagoff points out, Tribe concludes that "the interests of all entities 
affected by a policy must be taken into account." Sagoff 223. Sagoff correctly explains 
that the only difference between the "homocentric want-oriented perspective" Tribe is 
disparaging and Tribe's approach is that Tribe's approach is not homocentric. Tribe 
merely broadens the range of interests to be included in the utility calculus. Id. at 215- 
19. 
159. See generally Sagoff 223. Interestingly, one of Sagoffs arguments against Tribe 
is the animals and plants may prefer a nonnatural environment. Id. But the argument 
seems less than compelling in view of the numerous species which have dwindled or 
perished as a result of the encroachment of man upon their environs. 
160. Sagoff. 
161. Sagoff states: "As long as policies are intended to maximize the general satisfac- 
tion, they will be no better, morally or spiritually, than the interests they serve.'' Id. a t  
225. Sagoffs concern, therefore, is similar to that expressed by Tribe with regard to a 
utilitarian justification for wilderness preservation: that is, that the obligation to the 
wilderness will fade as interests change. 
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is an obligation to our cultural tradition, to the values which we 
have cherished and in terms of which nature and this nation are 
still to be described. 162 
He then states why he consideres this view to be nonutilitarian: 
It is difficult and indeed unnecessary to argue that fulfilling 
this obligation to our national values, to our history, and, there- 
fore, to ourselves confers any kind of a benefit; perhaps fulfilling 
a responsibility is itself a benefit; but this view requires not that 
we define "responsibility" in terms of "benefits," as the utili- 
tarian does, but that we define "benefits" in terms of "responsi- 
bilities." In any case, preservation of the qualities, and accord- 
ingly the values, that this nation, as a nation, has considered 
pecularily its own-and these are the qualities of na- 
ture-certainly obliges us to do otherwise than follow our plea- 
sure and profit. Consequently, there may be reason to think that 
fidelity to our historic values imposes both a "benefit" and a 
"COSt."163 
Indeed, there are costs and benefits in the preservation of values, 
just as any analysis of the merits of wilderness preservation itself 
reveals costs and benefits. What Sagoff has really performed is a 
cost-benefit analysis of value preservation to conclude, on bal- 
ance, that preserving values is worthwhile and that the wilder- 
ness, because it is a symbol of our national values, should be 
preserved. His discussion of defining "benefits" in terms of "re- 
sponsibilities" rather than "responsibilities" in terms of "bene- 
fits," even if persuasive, seems irrelevant to the conclusion that 
preserving a symbol of our national values is beneficial. Thus, 
Sagoff supplies us with yet another variable to include in the 
utility calculus-value preservation. ls4 
While Tribe and Sagoff may not have escaped utilitarianism, 
it may be the nonpecuniary benefits they point out that tip the 
balance in favor of maintaining a pure wilderness concept. In 
making this determination, however, it is recognized that a time 
may come when, because of an increased scarcity of goods obtain- 
able only by activities incompatible with a strict concept of wil- 
derness preservation, cost-benefit analysis yields a far different 
result than it does today. 
162. Sagoff 265. 
163. Id. 
164. Paradoxically, Sagoffs argument that the wilderness ought to be preserved for 
nonutilitarian reasons is not persuasive unless one is convinced that the preservation effort 
would be beneficial. 
THE WILDERNESS ACT 
B. A Two- Tiered Wilderness Concept 
The analysis presented above indicates the probability that 
preservation of a limited amount of wilderness in its pristine state 
is justified. That same analysis could also be used to demonstrate 
the merit in preserving additional areas in which limited com- 
mercial development would be, or has been al10wed.l~~ Thus, a 
two-tiered wilderness system composed of what could be labeled 
Grade I and Grade I1 wilderness areas is in order. Grade I areas 
would include lands to be maintained according to strict wilder- 
ness standards. Grade I1 areas would include lands in which all 
uses allowed under section 4 of the present Actle6 would be per- 
missible, both before and after inclusion within the system. The 
Grade I1 classification would impose stricter requirements than 
the present Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act16' in that wilder- 
ness preservation would be the prevailing administrative objec- 
tive rather than just one of many considerations governing ad- 
ministration. 
Clearly, cost-benefit analysis could be utilized to determine 
not only whether specific lands should be included in the wilder- 
ness system, but also whether those lands would be better suited 
for Grade I or Grade I1 classification. Thus, lands containing 
resources of high commercial value as well as desirable wilderness 
qualities would probably be suited for Grade I1 classification, 
while lands with little commercial potential and high wilderness 
value would certainly be reserved for Grade I status. This two- 
tiered concept is preferable to the exclusive application of either 
a strict or a lenient wilderness concept because it recognizes and 
preserves the wilderness characteristics of essentially primeval, 
though somewhat commercially exploited lands, while at  the 
same time maintaining other primitive lands according to the 
strictest wilderness definition. 
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE ACT: SOME SUGGESTIONS 
With the expiration of the Act's 10 year period for review of 
potential wilderness areas, Congress now has the opportunity to 
review the provisions of the Act and to make necessary adjust- 
ments. In light of the foregoing discussion, the following changes 
appear desirable: 
165. See note 148 and accompanying text supra. 
166. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra. 
167. See note 32 and accompanying text supra. 
754 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
(1) The administrative agencies should be provided with 
guidelines which clearly define the criteria to be considered in 
reviewing areas for designation as wilderness. This would elimi- 
nate, to a degree, the large amount of agency discretion in the 
review process and would foster uniformity in decisions concern- 
ing which areas are to be included within the NWPS . This sugges- 
tion, of course, has little importance unless Congress decides that 
there is merit in considering lands besides those set aside for 
review in the original Act. 
(2) The definition of "contiguous" should be clarified so 
that review of all areas in reasonable proximity to primitive areas 
is undertaken. Lands defined to be contiguous to a primitive area 
should include all those adjacent to the primitive area possessing 
the same ecological and geographical characteristics as the primi- 
tive area, whether or not those lands actually share common 
boundaries with the primitive area. 
(3) The Act should specify that all lands mandated for re- 
view under the Act, including contiguous areas, are to be pro- 
tected against all nonwilderness uses until such time as Congress 
acts on the Presidential recommendations regarding their wilder- 
ness suitability. 
(4) The Wilderness Act should be broadened to require the 
study of those lands which were not mandated for review under 
the original Act, but which possess significant wilderness charac- 
teristics. 
(5) An amendment should be seriously considered which 
would impose a time frame within which Congress must act on 
the affirmative recommendations of the President. Failure of 
Congress to act within the specified period, i. e . ,  120 days, would 
result in the automatic inclusion of the recommended area within 
the NWPS. This amendment appears especially appropriate in 
light of the fact that few, if any, Presidential recommendations 
have been disapproved by Congress. Such an amendment would 
do much to expedite the inclusion of lands into the NWPS and 
thereby reduce problems associated with protection of the lands 
pending review, recommendation, and congressional enactment. 
(6) The Wilderness Act should be amended to establish a 
two-tiered wilderness system-establishing Grade I and Grade 11 
wilderness areas-in place of the one level system which now 
exists. Grade I areas would be strictly maintained so that no use 
incompatible with pristine wilderness conditions would be per- 
mitted. Grade I1 areas would not be as stringently maintained. 
Activities such as water reclamation, the use of power equipment 
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(such as motorboats and helicopters), mining, and logging would 
be permitted, although closely regulated and limited. Logged- 
over forests could in included in Grade I1 areas under some cir- 
cumstances. Each area would be classified on the basis of a sepa- 
rate cost-benefit analysis. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although a product of considerable compromise, the Wilder- 
ness Act of 1964 has worked admirably well in the 11 years since 
its passage. The review procedures have been substantially com- 
plied with and the NWPS has been greatly enlarged in 26 states. 
There have been some problems, however, both with the pro- 
cedural aspects of the Act and with the Act's concept of wilder- 
ness preservation. Since the 10 year review process has ended, 
now is an appropriate time for Congress to take a critical look a t  
these deficiencies and to amend the Act accordingly. The estab- 
lishment of a two-tiered wilderness sytem would do much to elim- 
inate the inconsistencies in the Act and to satisfy, at  least in part, 
the preservationists as well as those representing commercial en- 
terprises. 
APPENDIX A
Areas of the National Forest System Included in the 
National Wilderness Preservation System 



























































































































































































































Areas of the National Park System Included in the 
National Wilderness Preservation System 
State Area Acreage Year Pub. Law 
1. Arizona Petrified Forest 50,260 1970 91-504 
2. California Lava Beds 28,460 1972 92-493 
3. California Lassen Volcanic 78,982 1972 92-510 
National Park 
4. Idaho Craters of the Moon 43,243 1970 91-504 
Part I1 
Areas of the National Park System Proposed for Inclusion in the 
National Wilderness Preservation System 
State Area Proposed Acreage 
1. Alaska Katmai 2,792,137.00 
2. Alaska Glacier Bay 2,803,840.00 
3. Alaska Mount McKinley 1,939,492.80 
















































Black Canyon of the Gunnison 
Colorado 
Dinosaur 












































































Areas of the National Wildlife Refuge System Included 
in the National Wilderness Preservation System 


































































West Sister Island 
Wichita Mountains 
Oregon Islands 
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Part I1 
Areas of the National Wildlife Refuge System Proposed 
for Inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation Program 
State Area Proposed Acreage 











































































Charles M. Russell 
Medicine Lake 
Red Rock Lakes 





Charles Sheldon Antelope 
Range 
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46. Oregon Oregon Islands 
47. South Carolina Santee 
48. Vermont Missisquoi 
49. Washington San Juan Islands 
